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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CITY OF ST. GEORGE, ] 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
STEVEN REESE CARTER, ; 
Defendant and Appellee. ] 
) Case No. 960704-CA 
) Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The court of appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal by provision of Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(f). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const., amend. 4. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 is quoted in its entirety at page 13, infra. 
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Utah Code Ann. §77-7-16 is quoted in its entirety at page 13, infra. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Appellant has faithfully summarized the nature and course of the proceedings 
in the district court. However, its Statement of Facts includes facts and circumstances which 
had not been communicated to and were not known by the arresting officer at the time he 
seized defendant and his vehicle. Information which was not made known to Officer 
Whipple will not sustain his actions and is dunnage in the context of the issues presented on 
this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The initial seizure of the defendant's person and vehicle was not supported by 
reasonable suspicion. The dispatcher's report described conduct which, in the location where 
it had been observed, did not constitute a public offense. Moreover, the report did not 
provide sufficient information from which one could reasonably have concluded that 
defendant would not comply with the law as he moved from private property onto the city 
street. 
Even if the initial seizure was supported by reasonable suspicion, the legal 
basis for detaining defendant was exhausted before the officer instructed defendant to exit 
his motor vehicle and the intensity of the encounter was illegally increased when the police 
conducted an intrusive search for evidence. This search was supported by a quantum of 
suspicion smaller than that which supplied the basis for the initial seizure. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INITIAL SEIZURE OF DEFENDANT'S PERSON AND 
VEHICLE WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE 
SUSPICION. 
When Officer Whipple parked behind defendant's pickup truck and activated 
the overhead lights, he seized both defendant and his vehicle. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648, 653 (1979). Such police measures are lawful only when officers are acting upon 
reasonable suspicion that an occupant of the vehicle has committed or is in the process of 
committing a public offense. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-
15. 
In the district court, defendant argued that his initial seizure was not supported 
by reasonable suspicion and that even if he was legally detained at the outset, the legal basis 
of the seizure had been exhausted and the authority to detain defendant terminated prior 
to his being ordered out of his vehicle. R 186-90, 200-02. The district court agreed with the 
latter of these contentions and granted defendant's motion to suppress. R 143-47, 202-05. 
If the court of appeals affirms the district court's order on the theory espoused by that court, 
it will not be necessary to decide whether or not the initial seizure was supported by 
reasonable suspicion. 
The city contends that the court of appeals should "assume" that this issue was 
correctly decided in the district court because defendant did not take a cross-appeal. See 
App. Br. at 12. If the district court ruling cannot be sustained on the grounds stated, the 
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court of appeals may resort to any theory which will sustain the district court provided that 
the party prevailing in the lower court argued that theory in that court. 5 Am Jur 2d, 
Appellate Review §§ 828-29. 
In concluding that Officer Whipple acted upon reasonable suspicion, the city 
and the district court lose sight of two important factors. First, the report of an open 
container in a motor vehicle which is located on private property is not the report of a 
public offense. And, second, the legality of the officer's actions are determined on the basis 
of the information which was available to him at the time he detained defendant. 
Section 41-6-44 of our code proscribes the operation of a motor vehicle 
anywhere within the geographical boundaries of the state while intoxicated. Section 41-6-
44.20, on the other hand extends its prohibition only to vehicles which are "on any highway.11 
Officer Whipple knew that the dispatch was not the report of an offense and appreciated 
the fact that the suspected offense would be committed only if the driver were to enter the 
public "highway" without first complying with the law. R 183-84. 
After he did not locate the "suspect" vehicle on the Arby's premises, Officer 
Whipple saw a vehicle parked on 700 South Street which matched the general vehicle 
description the dispatcher had provided. It was defendant's pickup truck. Whipple may 
have reasonably suspected that defendant's truck was in fact the vehicle which had been 
observed at Arby's, but his only basis for believing that the occupants of the vehicle were 
violating the law was his assumption that they would continue an activity which was legal in 
the location where that activity had been observed but which was prohibited at the location 
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where the vehicle was observed by the officer. 
The fact that someone is observed engaged in an activity which is legal in the 
location where the observation is made, but illegal in a location where he is observed a few 
minutes later, does not necessarily give rise to reasonable suspicion to believe that he did 
not comply with the law when he moved to the restricted location. As an example, persons 
who engage in hunting big game may, from time to time throughout the day, travel from 
location to location in motor vehicles. There are legal restrictions on the use of firearms 
which apply while traveling in a motor vehicle and do not apply in the field. The fact that 
one is observed in the field under circumstances which would be illegal on the highway does 
not give rise to reasonable suspicion that he is violating the law when he is immediately 
thereafter observed on the highway. 
The city is anxious to provide the court with the details of Mr. Hafen's 
observations of the suspect motorist leaving the drive-through window and approaching the 
public street while sipping what Hafen surmised to be a half full can of beer. App. Br. at 
5-6. 
At the time he pulled in behind the defendant's vehicle and activated his 
overhead lights, Officer Whipple did not know whether the container had been observed in 
the cab or bed of the pickup truck nor was he aware of the facts which indicated the 
apparent quantity of unconsumed beverage it contained. R 174-76, 182-83. These facts 
would have been relevant in determining whether there was reasonable suspicion that at the 
time the suspect vehicle entered the city street there was an "open container" in its 
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passenger compartment in which there remained a portion of the beverage. The city 
apparently recognizes the necessity of this information in formulating "reasonable suspicion." 
At the suppression hearing, the city presented evidence of all of Hafen's observations 
including those which had not been made known to the investigating officer before he 
initiated the "stop." While it may be relevant, any information which had not been conveyed 
to Whipple is immaterial to a determination of the search and seizure issue. The priority 
of the officer's conduct is evaluated on the basis of the information which was available to 
him when he acted. State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1088-89 (Utah 1986). 
Hafen's observations concerning the apparent volume of liquid in the container 
and the fact that the suspect vehicle was in motion and travelling in the direction of the 
public street when the driver was observed drinking from the container may have given rise 
to reasonable suspicion had Officer Whipple received this information prior to detaining 
defendant. Without this information, the officer was acting upon an impermissible 
assumption when he seized defendant and his vehicle. The information Whipple had 
received did not suggest that defendant would enter the city street without complying with 
the law. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THE INVESTIGATIVE STOP WAS SUPPORTED 
BY REASONABLE SUSPICION, THE ENCOUNTER WAS 
ILLEGAL IN TERMS OF ITS DURATION. 
An investigative stop that is supported by nothing more than reasonable 
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suspicion is limited in terms of its duration and intensity by the Fourth Amendment mandate 
that invasive searches for evidence be made only upon probable cause and by what 
unintrusive measures are reasonble given the nature of the public offense which are 
authorizes the initial stop. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1960). See also State v. Lopez, 
873 P.2d 1127, 1134-40 (1994); State v. Patefield, 303 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9-11 (CA 11/7/96). 
Cf. Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1980). A motorist who is stopped or otherwise "seized" upon 
reasonable suspicion of a violation of law can be legally detained "no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." See State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 
(Utah 1991). In addition to demanding an explanation of the motorist's actions which in 
most such cases have precipitated the stop, an officer "may request driver's license and 
vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation." Id. at 763. After he 
is cleared through this process, the motorist "must be allowed to proceed without being 
subject to further delay . . . . for additional questioning." Id. 
Officer Whipple detained defendant, questioned him specifically about the 
offense under investigation, summarily assessed defendant's physical and mental condition, 
and made what observations he could of the interior of defendant's vehicle. The city 
concedes that in this process the officer saw nothing, heard nothing, felt nothing, smelled 
nothing, which indicated that defendant was engaged in criminal activity. See App. Br. at 
8. When the computer check cleared defendant, Whipple concluded that everything 
appeared to be in order. R 184-85. At that point, if not sooner, any legal basis which may 
have once justified defendant's detention ceased to exist. The Terry stop was over. 
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Rather than terminating the encounter then, Officer Whipple increased its 
intensity, searching for evidence of defendant's consumption of alcohol, unlawfully extending 
the duration of defendant's detention. R 178, 185. 
In Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App.1992), a deputy sheriff stopped 
defendant's vehicle when it drifted into the emergency lane for a second time. The basis for 
the stop was suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol. When the deputy made 
contact with the driver, it was immediately obvious that neither of the occupants of the 
vehicle had been drinking alcohol and apparently they did not appear to be otherwise 
impaired. Although the basis for the investigative stop had evaporated, the deputy did not 
terminate the encounter. Instead he asked defendant if he had any alcohol, firearms, or 
drugs in the vehicle. Defendant denied possession of any contraband items and immediately 
offered to allow the deputy to search the vehicle. The ensuing search yielded four kilograms 
cocaine. 
Affirming the district court's order suppressing this evidence, the court of 
appeals concluded that the legal justification for the defendant's detention ended upon the 
discovery that he was not intoxicated and there was no legal basis for continuing the 
detention if only to ask the defendant about the possibility that he was in possession of 
alcohol, firearms and drugs. See id. at 655. Clearly, a motorist suspected of driving under 
the influence may be questioned about the possibility that he is in possession of intoxicants 
while the subject is lawfully detained. Nevertheless, when the suspicion underlying the stop 
is dispelled, the authority to detain the individual ends and that which would have followed 
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as a matter of routine becomes unwarranted governmental interference. 
In Godina-Luna, the authority to detain and question the suspect terminated 
almost immediately after the deputy made contact with the occupants of the vehicle. 
Conversly, in the instant case, Officer Whipple ascertained identities of the occupants of the 
suspect vehicle, confirmed the driver's licensure and vehicle registration, ran a computer 
check for wants and warrants, questioned the defendant and his passenger about in open 
containers in the vehicle, and made general observations of defendant, his passenger and his 
pickup truck; all without confirming or dispelling his suspicions. Once he had conducted the 
investigative activities permissible in the context of a Terry stop, Whipple's authority to detain 
defendant ended notwithstanding the fact that he had not definitively determined that there 
was no open container in the vehicle. At that level of investigation the officer could only 
conclude that everything seemed to be alright. 
No matter how unintrusive requiring defendant to exit the vehicle was or was 
not, there was no longer a legal basis for any further detention. The officer lacked the legal 
authority to detain defendant for the purpose of responding to one additional question, let 
alone directing him to exit his pickup truck for the purpose of facilitating the officer's search 
for evidence. By the time the challenged evidence was discovered the investigative stop was 
illegal in terms of its duration. 
POINT III 
THE ENCOUNTER WAS ILLEGAL IN TERMS OF ITS 
INTENSITY. 
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When a police officer makes an investigatory stop based upon reasonable 
suspicion, he may demand the suspect's name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-23. Cf. Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15. Reasonable suspicion gives the 
officer no authority to conduct an invasive search for evidence of crime. 
If, in the course of such an encounter, the officer makes such observations as 
give rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal conduct is afoot, he may continue 
the detention of the suspect until the legitimate investigative needs which attend the 
developing circumstances have been met. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). Ultimately, 
an officer may develop probable cause to believe the suspect has in fact committed or is in 
the process of committing a public offense and may, in some circumstances, arrest him and 
conduct an invasive search incident to that arrest. State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 
1986); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973). 
Every investigative stop is, to some extent, a search for evidence. An officer 
who initiates a traffic stop on suspicion of driving under the influence approaches the 
suspect's vehicle for the purpose of gathering information which will allow him to either 
confirm or dispel his initial suspicion. As he approaches the vehicle, he surveys those parts 
of the interior of the vehicle which are visible from his vantage point. Certainly he does this 
in part for his own safety, but he approaches the vehicle primarily for the purpose of 
investigating the suspected offense. He is looking for evidence-bottles, cans, whatever. As 
he stands alongside of the vehicle and obtains the driver's name, address and explanation 
of the irregular driving pattern, the officer continues his search for evidence. His search now 
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includes the suspect's appearance, demeanor, and speech and the presence or absence of 
the odor of alcohol. 
Obviously there are more effective methods of determining whether or not 
there are alcoholic beverage containers in the vehicle or alcohol in the suspect's blood. By 
taking more invasive measures, the police could determine these questions definitively and 
quantify all the available evidence. However, when an officer is acting upon reasonable 
suspicion, invasive measures are unreasonable and, therefore, incompatible with Fourth 
Amendment principles. 
Unless and until additional facts are developed which would justify escalating 
the intensity of the encounter beyond the scope of the typical Terry stop, an officer's "search" 
for evidence can be no more invasive than is the Terry stop itself-name, address, 
examination, and whatever is observable in the course of the encounter. 
The city has based its entire analysis on a false premise which confuses those 
principles of law which define the scope and limit the intensity of investigative stops with the 
principles which recognize the police officer's need in certain situations to employ invasive 
measures in the interest of assuring his own safety. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. An officer's 
right to search a suspect for the officer's own safety is limited to a pat down for weapons 
when there exist reasonable grounds to believe the suspect may be armed and dangerous. 
See id. at 24-27. Cf. §77-7-16. Greater invasion can be justified in the interest of officer 
safety then will be tolerated in the interest of uncovering evidence of crime where the 
invasion is supported by suspicion rather than cause. 
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Relying exclusively on Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), the city 
would have the court conclude that the scope and intensity of an investigation conducted 
pursuant to a Terry stop can be appropriately raised to levels which heretofore have been 
tolerated only in the context of the adoption of precautionary measures which slightly 
heighten the intensity of the encounter in the interest of assuring the safety of police officers. 
In Mimms, two Philadelphia police officers observed Harry Mimms driving an 
automobile with expired tags and initiated a traffic stop. Before questioning Mimms or even 
ascertaining his identity, one of the officers approaching on foot instructed Mimms to exit 
his automobile. As he complied, the officer observed a bulge in his jacket which in the 
ensuing "frisk" proved to be a firearm. By the time the case reached the United States 
Supreme Court, it had resolved itself into a single issue: Were Mimms' Fourth Amendment 
rights violated when the police officer, with "no reason to suspect foul play from this 
particular driver at the time of the stop," ordered Mimms to get out of the car? Id. at 110. 
There was apparently no dispute about the fact that this police officer 
routinely ordered all drivers out of their vehicles as a part of initiating the investigation of 
a traffic offense. See id. at 109-10. This was a precautionary measure which the officer 
routinely took for the purpose of establishing a face-to-face confrontation which reduced a 
suspect's ability to make unobserved movements. 
In justification of this practice, the Commonwealth proffered what the 
Supreme Court characterized as the "legitimate and weighty" concerns for the safety of 
police officers. The Court noted that according to one study approximately 30 percent of 
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police shootings occur while the officer is approaching a suspect seated in an automobile, 
See id. at 110. The Court further concluded that the hazard of accidental injury from 
passing traffic are arguably reduced if, "[rjather than conversing while standing exposed to 
moving traffic, the officer prudently may prefer the driver of the vehicle to step out of the 
car and off onto the shoulder of the road where the inquiry may be pursued with greater 
safety to both." Id. at 111. Balancing the interest in officer safety against the individual's 
right to be free from the "additional intrusion" which results in being required to exit the 
automobile, the Court concludes that the additional intrusion was de minimis. In the context 
of balancing these interests, the precautionary measure was not unreasonable. 
From these facts and statements of public policy, the city of St. George has 
concluded that Mimms should be interrupted to allow the police to routinely order motorists 
out of their vehicles for investigative as well as officer-safety purposes and to do so at any 
stage of a Terry stop. 
To fully appreciate the weakness of the city's premise, analysis, and conclusion, 
we must take one more look at Terry v. Ohio, supra. That landmark decision established two 
fundamental rules which applied to situations where police have reasonable suspicion, but 
lack probable cause which would support an arrest or authorize an invasive search for 
evidence. These holdings are roughly codified in the following sections of the Utah Code: 
Section 77-7-15. A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he 
has committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his name, address 
and an explanation of his actions. 
13 
Section 77-7-16. A peace officer who has stopped a person 
temporarily for questioning may frisk the person for a 
dangerous weapon if he reasonably believes he or any other 
person is in danger. 
The first of these two rules defines the circumstances under which peace 
officer may detain a citizen for investigative purposes without probable cause. It defines the 
scope of the officer's authority in that context and, by implication, the duration of the 
detention. On the other hand, the second of these rules does not purport to define the 
limits of a peace officer's authority to investigate the suspected offense or to conduct an 
invasive search for evidence. Although this rule of law if often applied in determining 
whether or not evidence has been legally seized, the rule simply recognizes the peace 
officer's right to take measures to protect himself from personal injury or death in the course 
of conducting an investigative stop. 
Nothing in Terry can be reasonably construed as authorizing peace officers who 
are engaged in an investigative stop to conduct a search for evidence on any level other than 
that which is implied by the authority to stop a suspect and demand his name, address, and 
an explanation of the actions which give rise to the officer's suspicion. Terry does not 
authorize the slightest physical manipulation of a suspect's person, clothing, or personal 
effects for the purpose of searching for evidence. To the extent Mimms may be read as 
expanding Terry, the extension related only to the rule which recognizes the officer's need 
to protect himself in the field. Nothing in Mimms can reasonably be read as extending the 
rule defining the scope and intensity of an investigation which is undertaken upon suspicion. 
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Because a motorist need not present any particular safety concern before he 
is asked to exit his vehicle, such a practice could theoretically be followed in every Terry stop 
where the suspect is driving an automobile. The city of St. George has apparently concluded 
that drivers may be required to exit their vehicle on the whim of the investigating officer or 
upon criteria which the officer himself establishes. Under the city's theory, this invasion can 
be justified as search for evidence. In other words, the escalation in the intensity of the 
encounter needs no justification at all. Moreover, the city apparently contends that 
increasingly invasive measures can be employed at any stage of the investigative stop, even 
after the investigating officer has completed everything he is authorized to do in the context 
of an investigative stop. Such a rule of law finds no support in Terry or Mimms. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that Officer Whipple's 
authority to conduct an investigation of the reported incident, if any he had, was extinguished 
before the defendant was required to exit his motor vehicle. Moreover, there was no 
justification for intensifying the investigative encounter. The district court's order should be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of April, 1997. 
JS 
Gary W. Pendleton 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
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